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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the impact of infrastructure investment on Spanish 
economic growth between 1850 and 1935. Using new infrastructure data and VAR 
techniques, this paper shows that the growth impact of local-scope infrastructure 
investment was positive, but returns to investment in large nation-wide networks were 
not significantly different from zero. Two complementary explanations are suggested 
for the last result. On the one hand, public intervention and the application of non-
efficiency investment criteria were very intense in large network construction. On the 
other hand, returns to new investment in large networks might have decreased 
dramatically once the basic links were constructed. 
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Infrastructure Investment and Spanish Economic Growth, 1850-1935 
1. Introduction 
This paper explores the economic effects of infrastructure investment during the 
first stages of Spanish industrialization. Despite abundant research on the topic, there is 
no agreement among historians on the impact that increases in the stock of 
infrastructure had on late nineteenth and early twentieth century Spanish economic 
growth. Research on the subject has focused to a large extent on the railroad system, 
which accounted for the highest share of infrastructure investment at the time, and 
which has been seen, alternatively, as either one of the “heroes” of Spanish 
industrialization or one of the explanatory factors for the country’s economic 
underperformance. 
Tortella (1973) set the basis of the pessimistic view. He pointed out that Spanish 
railroads were constructed ahead of demand and, as a consequence, railroad companies 
faced a situation of excess capacity that made them unprofitable during most of their 
lives. To make things worse, the construction of the Spanish railroads had very small 
“backward linkages”, since imports of the necessary materials were given generous 
tariff exemptions that deprived the Spanish iron industry of a crucial source of demand. 
Later on, however, Gómez Mendoza (1983) suggested a much more positive 
interpretation on the subject. He stressed the importance of the transport cost-saving 
effect of the Spanish railroad system. According to this author, the social savings of the 
Spanish railroads and their effects on economic growth were much larger than in other 
European countries due, among other reasons, to the lack of opportunities for the 
development of inland waterways in Spain. 
Subsequently, historians have raised several caveats about Gómez Mendoza’s 
optimistic interpretation. On the one hand, Tortella (1999, p. 250) and Comín et al. 
(1998, 1, pp. 140-141) have indicated that, despite the social saving evidence, the low 
density of use and the lack of profitability of the Spanish railroads constitute powerful 
proofs of their economic failure. On the other hand, further research has provided 
substantially lower estimates of the social savings of the Spanish railroads in the late 
nineteenth century (Barquín, 1999; Herranz-Loncán, 2002). However, at the same time, 
Herranz-Loncán (2005a) has pointed out that the social savings do not capture all the 
impact of the railroads, due to the difficulty to measure TFP spillovers. These might 
have been quite relevant in Spain, where nineteenth century market integration 
provoked a substantial change in the geography of economic activity (Tirado et al., 
2002; Rosés, 2003; Pons et al., forthcoming), as well as the gradual convergence in 
living standards across Spain (Rosés and Sánchez-Alonso, 2004). In summary, the 
economic impact of the Spanish railroads is still the object of an open debate, in which 
no agreement has been reached among researchers so far. 
This paper re-addresses the question of the growth impact of Spanish 
infrastructure investment during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century from a 
different viewpoint. Instead of focusing on railroads, as most previous research, it 
adopts an aggregate perspective that takes into account the whole infrastructure sector. 
Using a new data set of Spanish infrastructure for the period 1845-1935 and the most 
recent estimates of Spanish output and capital formation, I estimate a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) system that allows analyzing the relationship between 
infrastructure investment and economic growth. The VAR framework has often been 
used to measure the growth impact of infrastructure in present economies (Clarida, 
1993; McMillin and Smith, 1994; Otto and Voss, 1996; Pereira and Andraz, 2005). 
Among other advantages, this technique allows accounting for the non-stationarity of 
time-series data and for the presence of mutual causation and indirect relationships 
among different variables. In addition, VAR methods are especially appropriate in the 
case of historical research, in which the paucity of quantitative information prevents 
from using more sophisticated techniques (e.g. Groote et al., 1999). 
This paper describes how, in a preliminary analysis, the VAR approach seems to 
indicate that Spanish infrastructure investment did not have any significant long or 
short-term impact on productivity between 1850 and 1935. Previous papers that found 
infrastructure increases not to have any positive effects on productivity growth are, 
among others, Tatom (1991), Holtz-Eakin (1994), McMillin and Smith (1994), Baltagi 
and Pinnoi (1995), Balmaseda (1996) and Garcia-Milà et al. (1996). However, all these 
works analyze mature high-income economies, for which the available evidence on 
potential infrastructure shortages is inconclusive (Gramlich, 1994; Fernald, 1999). The 
absence of productivity effects of infrastructure is more difficult to find and interpret in 
industrializing countries in which the most basic infrastructure is being built. Groote et 
al. (1999), for instance, have observed a clear positive short-to-medium term reaction of 
Dutch GDP to infrastructure increases between 1853 and 1913. 
The outcomes of the VAR analysis may be better understood when Spanish 
infrastructure investment is disaggregated into two categories: local-scope infrastructure 
and large nation-wide transport and communication networks. In this case, the 
estimation results show that the former had an unmistakable positive impact on 
productivity and the apparent lack of growth effects of infrastructure in the aggregate 
analysis was actually driven by the latter. These results may be explained on the basis of 
the differences between both infrastructure categories. Unlike local-scope infrastructure, 
nation-wide transport and communication systems were characterized by two distinct 
features. Firstly, government intervention and non-efficiency allocation criteria were 
very influential in the investment decisions, and reduced the returns to some of the 
resources invested. And, secondly, large systems were characterized by decreasing 
returns to network expansion. As a consequence, although the construction of the basic 
network links probably provoked substantial changes in the economy, returns to 
additional investment were rather low. This paper provides therefore some possible 
explanations for other historical cases or for present LDC in which the effect of 
infrastructure on output appear to be muted in econometric analyses. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the infrastructure dataset 
that has been used in the estimation and offers a brief summary of the process of 
infrastructure construction in Spain between the central years of the nineteenth century 
and the eve of the Civil War of 1936-1939. Section 3 presents the model that has been 
used to analyze the relationship between infrastructure and economic growth, and the 
main estimation results. In Section 4, I discuss some possible explanations for the lack 
of response of Spanish productivity to investment in transport and communication 
networks. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Infrastructure investment in Spain, 1845-1935 
Most econometric analyses of the growth impact of infrastructure investment use 
public capital figures as a proxy for infrastructure. This procedure might be justified to 
some extent in the case of present economies (Gramlich, 1994, p. 1177), but it would 
have been misleading for late nineteenth and early twentieth century Spain, where a 
large number of assets, such as railroads, tramways, the telephone system, power 
distribution networks and some hydraulic works (i.e., more than 50 per cent of the 
infrastructure stock) were privately owned. Instead, this paper is based on a recent 
estimation of Spanish infrastructure investment between 1845 and the Civil War, which 
includes not only information about public capital formation, but also data on private 
infrastructure investment. The new series include the following infrastructure 
categories: transport (railroads, roads, urban transport, waterways and ports), 
communications (telegraph and telephone networks), power distribution (gas and 
electricity), hydraulic works (dams and irrigation canals) and urban and suburban 
infrastructure, and their estimation is based on a full range of both public and private 
sources: government records (for roads, ports or public hydraulic works), private 
companies’ accounts (for railroads, tramways or the telephone system) or, in other cases 
(such as energy distribution or the telegraph system), physical indicators of the 
evolution of the infrastructure stock (coming from public statistics or technical and 
historical literature) which have been valued on the basis of private firms’ accounting 
information or engineering cost reports. The complete sources and infrastructure data 
set may be seen in Herranz-Loncán (2005b). 
Table 1 reports the distribution of infrastructure investment among different 
categories and its importance within Spanish GDP before 1935; the complete series is 
depicted in Figure 1 below. The most prominent feature in the evolution of Spanish 
infrastructure is indeed the abnormally high investment rate of the years 1855-1866, 
which corresponded to the earliest and most intense Spanish railroad mania, and to a 
substantial simultaneous increase in state investment in the road network, ports and the 
telegraph system. The investment mania ended in 1866 with a deep crisis and 
infrastructure construction only resumed in the mid-1870s, at a much lower rate than 
before. 
 
Table 1 
Spanish infrastructure investment rate and composition, 1845-1935 (%) 
 Infr. inv./ 
GDP 
Railroads Urban 
transport 
Roads Ports Telecom. Energy 
distrib. 
Hydr.  
Works 
Total 
 
1845/55 1.19a 43.71 0.00 40.42 3.51 0.16 0.57 11.63 100 
1856/65 2.80 74.92 0.00 17.23 4.00 0.52 0.20 3.14 100 
1866/75 0.78 54.72 0.00 32.73 9.11 0.27 1.10 2.07 100 
1876/85 1.08 65.39 0.33 28.05 2.00 0.49 1.81 1.93 100 
1886/95 1.13 63.08 0.98 21.45 7.82 1.48 2.33 2.85 100 
1896/1905 0.93 44.49 7.27 21.09 15.26 0.54 5.86 5.49 100 
1906/15 1.00 31.67 3.73 21.46 16.90 2.12 14.45 9.66 100 
1916/25 1.34 21.05 11.70 18.54 7.17 3.52 29.64 8.38 100 
1926/35 1.96 15.88 4.56 30.92 8.74 9.53 18.38 12.00 100 
1845/1895 1.42a 64.67 0.15 25.76 4.20 0.67 1.06 3.50 100 
1895/1935 1.30 28.57 5.90 24.05 10.50 5.09 16.85 9.02 100 
1845/1935 1.37a 39.77 4.10 24.65 8.54 3.71 11.92 7.31 100 
Source: Herranz-Loncán (2005b), and GDP from Prados de la Escosura (2003). 
Note: (a) Period starts in 1850. 
 
Several periods may be distinguished in the evolution of Spanish infrastructure 
investment from 1875 onwards. Between this year and 1895 the main feature of 
infrastructure capital formation was the absolute prominence of the railroads, which 
absorbed nearly two thirds of the resources invested. During the same period, the road 
network accounted for 24 per cent of the total resources and the shares of other types of 
infrastructure remained very small. As a result, by 1895 a railroad network of 12,291 
km. had been established that, although not very dense in comparative terms, serviced 
the whole territory of the country.1 After that year, railroad capital formation stagnated 
due to the virtual completion of the main network, and a process of diversification of 
infrastructure investment started. The reduction in the importance of railroads firstly 
benefited ports and urban and suburban transport and, later on, irrigation infrastructure, 
the telephone system and, especially, electricity distribution. Meanwhile, the road 
network kept a constant share within total infrastructure investment. The diversification 
of infrastructure investment reached its zenith during the last investment cycle of the 
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 By 1900, the density of the Spanish railroad network was 26 km of line/km2 of surface, much lower than 
the French (81) or the Italian one (55); Herranz-Loncán (2002), p. 167. 
period under study, i.e. under Primo de Rivera’s Dictatorship and the Second Republic 
(1923-1936). During those years, the government devoted increasing resources to roads, 
ports and hydraulic works, whereas private investment flourished in the electricity 
sector, urban transport and the telephone system. The coincidence of state activism with 
the dynamism of private investment resulted in the highest levels of infrastructure 
capital formation of the whole period. 
In sum, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a complex 
infrastructure stock was built in Spain that, despite its limitations, might be expected to 
have provoked substantial reductions in transaction costs in the economy, and to have 
opened up prospects for the industrialization of the country. The main component of the 
new Spanish infrastructure was indeed the railroad system, but its construction was 
accompanied by an increase in the stock of many other assets. In the next section the 
new dataset is used to analyze the extent to which the economy responded to that 
continuous improvement in the availability of infrastructure. 
 
3. Econometric model and results 
To approach the growth impact of infrastructure investment, I use a standard 
production function with one aggregate output (y) and three inputs: infrastructure capital 
(g), machinery and equipment capital (k) and labor (n). All series are taken in 
logarithms:2 
y - n = α + β1 (k – n) + β2 · g      (1) 
This section reports the results of the estimation of model (1) for the Spanish economy 
during the period 1850-1935. Annual data on GDP, labor, and machinery and 
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 Model (1) assumes constant returns to scale between labor and machinery and equipment capital but 
increasing returns to scale across the three inputs. An alternative specification might be: y - n = α +              
+ β1 (k–n)+ β2  (g –n), i.e. assuming constant returns to scale across the three inputs. The estimation 
results of this alternative model are very similar to those of model (1), and available from the author upon 
request. 
equipment capital come from the recent estimates by Prados de la Escosura (2003), and 
infrastructure capital has been taken from Herranz-Loncán (2005b); all these series are 
expressed in real terms. As far as the capital variables are concerned, investment data 
have been preferred to stock figures. Although capital is usually included in stock terms 
in the standard production function framework, the use of capital stock variables in a 
VAR analysis is troublesome, since they are usually integrated of second order, whereas 
production is highly unlikely to be so (Haldrup, 1998; Otto and Voss, 1996). Therefore, 
as in other similar analyses (Sturm et al., 1999; Pereira and Andraz, 2005), investment 
figures have been preferred here, in order to keep the homogeneity among the time-
series properties of the data. This choice may involve a loss of information on the 
longest term relationships between the variables, because using investment instead of 
stock variables is equivalent to consider only the influence of the pace of growth of 
capital on output, independently of the stock level. Therefore, the presence of DRS or 
IRS in the relationship under study may be missing in the analysis. However, on the 
other hand side, the use of investment variables in growth analyses has been given 
support from different perspectives by Scott (1993) and Levine and Renelt (1992). In 
addition, if reverse causation from output to investment is present, the investment 
decision-making process is better captured by the investment variables than by the stock 
series. Figure 1 plots the variables of model (1) in order to provide a visual sense of 
their joint evolution. 
Fig 1. Variables of the Model
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As a lead-up to the estimation outcomes, Table 2 displays the results of the 
Granger-causality test for each pair of variables of the model. Although this test does 
not indicate causality itself, but just precedence or information content, it provides a 
preliminary approach to the potential relationships among the variables. According to 
the table, GDP and machinery investment per worker are both helpful in the prediction 
of all other variables. By contrast, infrastructure investment does not help to predict 
either output or machinery investment. Thus, the simple evidence coming from the 
Granger-causality analysis does not support the idea that infrastructure had a positive 
impact on Spanish economic growth during the country’s industrialization. 
 
Table 2 
Granger-Causality Tests (2 lags) 
H0 F- stat. 
k-n does not Granger-cause y-n 3.15* 
y-n does not Granger-cause k-n 4.62* 
g does not Granger-cause y-n 1.43 
y-n does not Granger-cause g 5.03** 
g does not Granger-cause k-n 1.52 
k-n does not Granger-cause g 4.49* 
* Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level. 
** Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10 percent level. 
 
Before estimating the model with non-stationary time series in levels, I test if all 
the variables are integrated of order one and cointegrated. I have applied in all cases the 
standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, since the lack of structural 
breaks in the series does not make the application of alternative test specifications 
necessary.3 The test results are shown in Table 3, and they indicate that the hypothesis 
of the presence of a unit root cannot be rejected in any case. 
 
Table 3 
Unit root tests (1850-1935) 
Variable ADF t-stat. PP t-stat. 
y - n -3.39 -3.39 
k - n -3.09 -3.23 
g -3.33 -2.30 
H0: Presence of a unit root. 
                                                          
3
 All the series have been applied the Vogelsang test, which is aimed at contrasting the existence of one-
time breaks in linear trending data in the presence of serial correlation, regardless of whether a unit root is 
present or not; see Vogelsang (1997). The hypothesis of no structural break has not been rejected for any 
of the variables. 
The model has been subjected to the Engle-Granger and Johansen tests for the 
presence of cointegration among the variables. The specification of the latter (lag length 
and deterministic components) has been selected through the application of multivariate 
generalizations of the Akaike and Schwartz information criteria and the use of the 
Pantula principle; the optimum system contains two lags and a constant. The outcomes 
of both tests, which are shown in Table 4, indicate that the existence of a single 
cointegration relationship cannot be rejected. This allows interpreting the relationship 
among the variables as structural. Table 5 shows the Engle-Granger estimates of the 
cointegration relationship. 
 
Table 4 
A) Johansen cointegration test (trace). 
H0: No. of cointegration relationships 
None 30.76a 
At most 1 12.47 
At most 2 0.06 
 
B) Engle-Granger cointegration test 
H0: No cointegration among the variables 
Test stat. 4.04b 
a
 Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 per cent level 
b
 Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 per cent level.  
 
Table 5 
Cointegration Equation (VEC model). 
Left-hand variable: y-n 
k - n 0.240 
(0.010) 
g  0.008 
(0.016) 
Constant -3.856 
(0.178) 
Note: standard errors in brackets. 
 
The coefficients in Table 5 have the expected sign, showing a positive 
relationship between the capital variables and productivity. However, the coefficient of 
infrastructure investment is surprisingly low. If the estimated coefficients were 
interpreted as elasticities, figures in the table would indicate that, during the period 
under analysis, a 1 per cent increase in machinery investment per capita resulted in the 
long term in a 0.24 per cent increase in productivity, but the effect of a 1 per cent 
increase in infrastructure investment per capita was negligible. These coefficients, 
however, cannot be interpreted directly as elasticities of output to investment, due to the 
possibility of reverse causation. In other words, the cointegration relationship may arise, 
at least in part, because the investment variables were responding to output fluctuations. 
Actually, this hypothesis has already been suggested by the outcomes of the Granger-
causality test, and is confirmed by the results of the impulse-response analysis of the 
system, which are shown in Figure 2. The impulse-response graphs capture the gradual 
reaction of each variable to shocks coming from the others when all relationships in the 
system are considered. Impulse-response estimates have been obtained through the use 
of Pesaran and Shin (1998) generalized approach, which has the advantage of being 
invariant to the ordering of the variables. The significance of the effects has been 
evaluated through the observation of Montecarlo calibrated standard errors, which are 
also reported in the graphs.4 
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Fig. 3. Impulse-response analysis of the system (Model 1)
 
 
The results of the income-response analysis confirm the main intuitions provided 
by the Granger-causality test. The evolution of GDP per worker exerted a clear 
influence on both investment variables during the period under analysis. Shocks to 
productivity had a positive short to medium-term impact on infrastructure construction, 
and a long-term positive impact on machinery and equipment investment. In turn, as 
might be expected, shocks to machinery and equipment investment had a long-term 
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 Figure 3 corresponds to an unrestricted VAR system, which does not impose the long-term restrictions 
associated with the cointegration relationship, but allows them to be satisfied asymptotically.  
Fig. 2. Impulse-response analysis of the system 
positive impact on productivity, being machinery investment, therefore, a crucial source 
of economic growth during the period. By contrast, neither productivity nor machinery 
investment seem to have responded to shocks to infrastructure investment. In other 
words, the impulse-response analysis would suggest that the growth impact of Spanish 
infrastructure investment was negligible during the period under analysis. This result 
strongly contrasts, for instance, with those obtained for the Netherlands between 1853 
and 1913 by Groote et al. (1999), who found infrastructure to have a clearly significant 
positive impact on GDP. 
A step further in the explanation of this surprising result may be achieved 
through the disaggregation of infrastructure investment into two different categories: 
large transport and communication networks (railroads, roads, ports, the telephone and 
the telegraph systems) and assets with a local or regional scope (urban transport, power 
distribution and water infrastructure). There are two reasons that justify this distinction. 
The first is the relative intensity of the state intervention in each of those two 
infrastructure categories. The second is associated to their specific network 
characteristics. 
Regarding the first reason, Millward (2004) has recently stressed the differences 
among late nineteenth century European states’ policies in each one of those 
infrastructure categories before 1914. In the case of the local networks of gas, electricity 
and urban transport, the evolution of investment was hardly affected by state 
intervention, and where public (municipal) ownership of those networks developed, it 
was not aimed at expanding infrastructure but at increasing public revenues. In contrast, 
in the case of large transport and communication networks, European governments tried 
to encourage investment in several ways: by guaranteeing returns to capital, by 
providing subsidies to construction and operation costs, or directly through state 
ownership. According to Millward, the reasons for governments’ attitude towards those 
nation-wide networks are mainly social and political, such as the potential of the 
telegraph and the railroads to promote national unification, their capacity to facilitate 
the dispatch of troops and military supplies, and the governments’ interest to control 
information and the movement of people and goods. In other words, late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century European governments considered the development of large 
networks as a means to achieve several social and political objectives, and not merely as 
an instrument of economic progress. 
Research on the allocation effects of investment criteria different from pure 
efficiency in present economies indicates that the inefficient allocation of public 
investment may be expected to have an influence on the growth impact of infrastructure, 
through a decrease in the returns to the resources invested (e.g. Evans, 1991; De la 
Fuente et al., 1995; Cadot et al., 1999; Caminal, 2004; Castells and Solé-Ollé, 2005). 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, the impact of infrastructure investment may be expected to 
be lower in the case of those infrastructure industries (such as late nineteenth century 
European large networks) in which state intervention and the influence of inefficient 
allocation criteria was higher. 
Network arguments also justify a distinction between local-scope infrastructure 
and large transport and communication networks. Usually, infrastructure analyses 
assume the services of public capital to be proportional to the resources invested. 
However, as Fernald (1999) has pointed out, this approach is inappropriate in the case 
of spatially interconnected networks, where the marginal productivity of any link 
depends on the capacity and configuration of the rest. More concretely, once the basic 
links of a large network are established, the marginal productivity of additional links 
may gradually decrease. This reasoning is consistent with Fernald’s own findings that 
the massive road-building of the 1950’s and 1960’s in the US had a high impact on 
productivity but, by contrast, roads appear to have had a normal (or even zero) return 
since the 1970’s. In my research, network expansion should be expected to have 
decreasing returns in the case of large nation-wide transport and communication 
systems, rather than in local-scope infrastructure, which was very often made up of 
isolated assets or small networks with low internal connectivity. 
The series of Spanish investment in local-scope infrastructure and large transport 
and communication networks are shown in Figure 3. They reflect the process of gradual 
diversification of infrastructure investment that was described in Section 2. More 
concretely, after the first railroad mania of 1855-1865, when the basic links of the 
railroad network were built, investment in nation-wide transport and communication 
infrastructure tended to stagnate, whereas local-scope infrastructure went on growing at 
a very fast pace until the late 1920’s. This might be considered as an indirect sign of 
decreasing returns to the expansion of Spanish large transport and communication 
systems. 
 
Figure 3. Spanish investment in large networks and local-scope infrastructure (1850-1935)
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Figure 4 shows the outcomes of the impulse-response analysis of the model 
when infrastructure is disaggregated into the two categories considered.5 Most results 
are consistent with those obtained in the aggregate analysis. Firstly, increases in GDP 
per worker exerted a positive influence on all kinds of investment. Secondly, machinery 
and equipment investment had a long-term positive impact on economic growth. 
Thirdly, as far as the impact of infrastructure investment is concerned, productivity 
appears to have responded positively to shocks to local scope infrastructure, but not to 
increases in large transport and communication networks. In addition, according to the 
graphs, investment in large networks appears to have crowded-out capital formation in 
local scope infrastructure, i.e. in those assets that had more positive growth effects. In 
other words, the lack of a significant response of output to shocks in Spanish 
infrastructure investment, which was found in the aggregate analysis, was actually 
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 For space reasons, the outcomes of the unit-root and Johansen tests are not reported, although they still 
yield positive results when the infrastructure variable is disaggregated. 
driven by investment in large transport and communication networks, both directly and 
indirectly through its negative effect on local-scope infrastructure growth. 
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On the basis of these results, the next section addresses two different questions. 
On the one hand, it analyzes to what extent the two aforementioned features of large 
networks (i.e. state intervention and decreasing returns to network expansion) were 
relevant in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Spanish transport and 
communication systems. And, on the other hand, it explores the extent to which those 
two factors may explain the lack of response of productivity to increases in 
infrastructure investment. 
Fig. 4. Impulse-response analysis of the system (two infrastructure categories) 
4. State intervention and decreasing returns to network expansion in Spanish 
infrastructure investment 
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century Spain is a good example of 
Millward’s (2004) considerations about the different intensity that state intervention had 
on large transport and communication networks and on local-scope infrastructure. 
Industries of the second group, such as urban transport and power distribution, largely 
consisted of small scale undertakings, which stemmed from the initiative of private 
firms or, in a few cases, from municipal governments with short financial capacity. In 
those sectors, public intervention to encourage investment was not very important 
before 1936 (Antolín, 1991 and 1999). The government’s role was more relevant in the 
case of water infrastructure from 1911 onwards, but relatively little was achieved in this 
field in Spain before 1936 and, as a consequence, most water infrastructure investment 
had a relatively small scale and a predominantly local or regional scope during the 
period under analysis (Fernández Clemente, 2000). 
By contrast, the government owned most of the road and telegraph networks, 
and undertook since the mid-nineteenth century an active policy to extend them to the 
whole country (Herranz-Loncán, 2005b). Along that process, it was constantly criticized 
for the impact that local lobbies and electoral strategies had on resource allocation 
(Alzola y Minondo, 1979; García Ortega, 1982; Calvo, 2001). According to the 
government itself, the influence of non-efficiency objectives and local lobbies implied 
in some cases the construction of: “two, three and sometimes four roads servicing too 
abundantly the same public interests, and other going through desert areas, and with 
such a high cost that it should have been enough to defer its construction in more fertile 
and populated terrain”.6 At the same time, although the railroads were left in private 
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 R.D. 09/17/1886 (my translation). 
hands, the government gave substantial subsidies to their construction in order to 
encourage their nation-wide expansion, and kept the power to decide over the routes to 
be built. In particular, the initial 1855 Railroad Act gave preference to the construction 
of the trunk routes from Madrid to the main ports and frontiers and, later on, the 1870 
and 1877 Acts reflected the government’s wish to connect all Spanish provinces to the 
network, and to reduce inequality among provincial railway endowments, according to 
the so-called “theory of the dispossessed provinces” (Alzola y Minondo, 1979). In sum, 
in the case of large transport and communication networks, the Spanish government’s 
intervention involved the widespread application of investment criteria different from 
pure efficiency, such as equity, the administrative and political unification of the 
country, the influence of lobbies or electoral considerations. 
As Millward (2004) illustrates, this situation was not exceptional among the 
European economies. However, the inefficient allocation of investment might be 
expected to have had worse effects in Spain than in other countries, due to her low 
population density. Cost-benefit analysis of road investment indicates that output losses 
due to the application of non-efficiency investment criteria are higher in countries with 
large sparsely-populated areas, because the benefit/cost ratio of road projects decreases 
with population density (Evans, 1991; Glover and Simon, 1975). Spanish population 
density was one of the lowest in Europe at the time, only higher than in Russia and the 
Nordic countries,7 due to both environmental and historical reasons. On the one hand, 
Spain had one of the highest shares of unproductive terrain in Europe, due to her 
difficult relief, and the aridity of most Spanish regions was a strict binding constraint for 
land productivity growth before the twentieth century. On the other hand, the 
colonization of new lands faced institutional limits in some areas of the country at least 
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 By 1910 the Spanish demographic density was 39.2 inhabitants per square km., i.e. 63 per cent of the 
Portuguese, 52 per cent of the French and around 30 per cent of the Italian and British equivalent figures. 
until the early nineteenth century (Llopis, 2002). In addition, since population was not 
evenly distributed among the Spanish regions, a large share of the territory was barely 
deserted. In 1910, the 26 least populated provinces (accounting for 60 per cent of the 
country’s surface), had densities lower than 40 inhabitants per square km., and 14 of 
them (accounting for 31 per cent of the country’s surface) were virtually empty, with 
less than 25 inhabitants per square km. By contrast, in France, a European medium-
density country whose surface was similar to the Spanish one, the départéments with 
less than 40 or 25 inhabitants per square km. only accounted for 10 and 3 per cent of the 
country’s surface, respectively.8 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, a policy addressed to the widespread extension of 
transport and communication networks would be more costly in Spain than in most 
European countries, since a high share of investment would be allocated to virtually 
deserted areas, and would therefore have a rather low benefit/cost ratio. Actually, 
between 1860 and 1922, 60 per cent of the new road mileage and 52 per cent of the new 
railroad mileage was constructed in provinces that had less than 40 inhabitants per 
square km in 1910. In the case of the emptiest areas of the country (with densities lower 
than 25 inhabitants per square km in 1910), those percentages were 29 and 17, 
respectively.9 Out of that investment, a certain share was probably justified from an 
efficiency point of view, since routes that went across rural areas could be important 
either as links between two distant urban centers or as ways to export domestic 
agricultural or mineral products. However, in many cases the economic returns to those 
undertakings are likely to have been lower than the opportunity cost of the invested 
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 Own calculations from Mitchell (1998). 
9
 Own calculation from Memoria de Obras Públicas (1860), Estadística de Obras Públicas (1922), 
Anuario de Ferrocarriles de D. Enrique de la Torre (1922) and Censo de Población de España (1930). 
resources, especially if attention is paid to the contemporaries’ complaints that many of 
those routes were the result of electoral strategies or lobbying pressures. 
Network arguments may also be helpful to understand the lack of response of 
productivity to shocks to investment in large transport and communication systems, 
especially in the case of the railroads. As was outlined in the introduction, the 
“optimistic” interpretation of the Spanish railroad history has stressed the transport cost-
saving effect of the railroads and their impact on market integration. However, the 
potential impact of each section of the railroad network on the integration of Spanish 
markets was very different. This may be inferred from the analysis of the gradual 
changes that the construction of the railroads provoked in the urban market potential of 
the four largest Spanish cities (Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Seville). The market 
potential of each city is calculated here as: 
∑
≠
=
=
n
ij
j ij
j
i
d
popMP
1
; 
where j are the province capital cities and those towns with a population larger than 
20,000 during the whole or part of the period 1860-1930, and dij, is the shortest distance 
between i and j through the railroad network in each year. Figure 5 shows the evolution 
of the unweighted average of the urban market potential of the four cities considered, 
after normalizing it to a level of 100 in 1935. The population data required to estimate 
that series have been taken from the Spanish censuses,10 and the distance between each 
pair of cities has been measured by the author, for each year of the period under study, 
                                                          
10
 In order to make up for the effect of demographic changes, population figures for each town have been 
set fixed at their 1900 level. Luna Rodrigo (1988) warns that, in some cases, the census data for some 
municipalities do not correspond to real urban towns but to the administrative aggregation of several 
small villages. In order to make up for this problem, she excludes from urban population those 
municipalities that lacked a significant number of high buildings, or which included more than ten 
population centers, or whose main center was smaller than 5,000 people. This procedure has also been 
followed here. 
through the examination of the effect of the construction of each railroad link on travel 
routes. 
 
Fig. 5. Spanish railroad mileage and market potential of the main Spanish cities through the railroad network
(1850-1935)
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According to the graph,11 most of the increase in the urban market potential of 
the main Spanish cities was provided by the links that were constructed before 1866, 
which constituted the “core” of the network. Those were the lines that connected the 
main Spanish urban centers among them, and that ran through the wealthiest areas of 
Spain (such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, Levante or Western Andalusia). Once 
those basic links had been constructed, there was little margin left for further increases 
in the market potential of the Spanish cities through the opening of new routes. The 
railroad lines that were built after 1866 were mostly located in rural and sparsely-
populated areas (such as Extremadura, Western Castile or the South-East of Spain) and 
did not link important urban centers. It is not surprising therefore that they were highly 
unprofitable and remained underutilized during most of their lives. Actually, they could 
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 The level of the market potential was not the same in the four cities. Differences in the distance to the 
main urban markets brought the Barcelona and Madrid market potential ca. 20 per cent over and under 
the average, respectively. On the other hand, the timing of the evolution of the market potential was 
similar in all cities except Barcelona, where it started growing before, due to the early construction of the 
first Catalan railroads. 
only operate on the basis of a much more intense state intervention than the “core” of 
the network, with higher subsidies and a much higher leverage ratio (Tedde, 1978; 
Nadal, 1975). The difference among the two sections of the Spanish railroad network 
may be observed in Table 6, which reflects the situation of the “core” and the 
“peripheral” lines at the beginning of the twentieth century, when the railroad system 
was already fully developed. As may be seen in the table, the density of use of the 
“peripheral” lines was 53 per cent that of the “core” ones in the case of freight transport, 
and 42 per cent in the case of passenger traffic. As a consequence, revenues per km. 
were much lower and financial returns much poorer in the lines that were constructed 
after 1873. As may be seen in the table, by 1904/1905, when the profitability of the 
Spanish railroads was close to its historical maximum, financial returns in the 
“peripheral” lines were only 2.2 per cent of the value of the capital invested, whereas 
returns to the “core” lines were close to 6 per cent. 
 
Table 6 
Density of use and financial returns of Spanish railroads (1904-1905) 
  LINES 
OPEN 
BEFORE 
1873 
LINES 
OPEN 
AFTER 
1873 
WHOLE 
NETWORK 
Mileage 7,482 5,672 13,224 
Density of passenger traffic (thousand passenger-
km per km) 
166 89 132 
Density of freight traffic (thousand ton-km per km) 247 103 185 
Gross revenue per km of line (pesetas) 29,125 13,422 22,313 
Net revenue per km of line (pesetas) 15,720 4,667 10,926 
Working expenses/Gross Revenue (%) 46 65 51 
Net revenue/capital cost (%) 5.63 2.20 4.36 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data in Estadística de Obras Públicas (1904-5). 
Note: Figures in the table are not exact, because the source does not distinguish within the different lines 
of the networks of four companies which were only partially in operation in 1873 (MZA, Andaluces, 
MZOV and Asturias, Galicia y León). The networks of the first two companies have been included among 
the lines constructed before 1873, because most of their mileage was already in operation at that date, 
whereas MZOV and Asturias, Galicia y León have been included in the other group for the opposite 
reason. 
 
The Spanish railroads provide therefore a good example of Fernald’s 
consideration that assuming the services of public capital to be proportional to the stock 
is not an appropriate procedure for the analysis of the growth impact of spatially 
interconnected networks (Fernald, 1999, p. 624). In Spain, the marginal productivity of 
railroad investment probably changed dramatically over time, because the construction 
of the basic railroad links before 1866 would have a much higher impact on economic 
growth than further additions to the network. To a large extent, this situation may help 
to explain the outcomes of the estimation of the VAR system. Since the estimation 
results that have been presented in Section 3 refer to the whole period 1850-1935, the 
positive growth impact of the links that were built before 1866 is likely to have been 
made up for in the estimates by the low growth effects and the low benefit/cost ratio of 
further additions to the network. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Using cointegration and VAR techniques, this paper shows that investment in 
local-scope infrastructure exerted a clearly positive impact on Spanish economic growth 
between 1850 and 1935. By contrast, returns to investment in large nation-wide 
networks were not significantly different from zero. The second finding may appear, 
either as a confirmation of the views of the most pessimistic Spanish railroad historians, 
or as a surprising result, given the significant transport cost-saving effects of the 
Spanish railroads and the substantial spatial reorganization of activity that took place in 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century Spain as a result of market integration. Here 
I suggest two complementary explanations for the apparent lack of a positive impact of 
investment in large infrastructure networks on Spanish productivity growth. 
Firstly, public intervention was very intense in large transport and 
communication networks and, as a consequence, non-efficiency criteria were very 
relevant in the allocation of the resources invested. In that context, output losses due to 
the application of non-efficiency investment criteria may have been quite high in Spain, 
due to her low population density. Secondly, returns to new investment may have 
decreased dramatically over time because, once the basic links of the networks had been 
built, the opportunities for highly productive investment gradually diminished. Both 
reasons would have decreased the aggregate impact of investment in large networks to 
negligible levels, despite the high potential benefits of the construction of the “core” 
links of those networks. At the same time, as far as different sections of her large 
infrastructure networks might have had rather different impact, Spain would provide an 
example of Fernald’s (1999) suggestion that the conventional measures of capital and 
the usual linearity assumptions are not completely appropriate to carry out econometric 
analyses of the growth impact of this type of networks. 
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